Opium production in Afghanistan, which provides more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin, broke all records in 2006, reaching a historic high despite ongoing U.S.-sponsored eradication efforts, the Bush administration reported yesterday.
In addition to a 26 percent production increase over past year — for a total of 5,644 metric tons — the amount of land under cultivation in opium poppies grew by 61 percent. Cultivation in the two main production provinces, Helmand in the southwest and Oruzgan in central Afghanistan, was up by 132 percent.
U.S. Army Col. Paul Calbos walks through a field of opium poppies in southern Afghanistan. This year’s crop set records in the world’s leading heroin producer.
White House drug policy chief John Walters called the news “disappointing.”
The administration has cited resurgent Taliban forces as the main impediment to stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, and the U.S. military investment has far exceeded anti-narcotic and development programs. But U.S. military and intelligence officials have increasingly described the drug trade as a problem that rivals and in some ways exceeds the Taliban, threatening to derail other aspects of U.S. policy.
“It is truly the Achilles’ heel of Afghanistan,” Gen. James L. Jones, the supreme allied commander for NATO, said in a recent speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. Afghanistan is NATO’s biggest operation, with more than 30,000 troops. Drug cartels with their own armies engage in regular combat with NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan, he said. “It would be wrong to say that this is just the Taliban. I think I need to set that record straight,” he added.
“They have their own capability to inflict damage, to make sure that the roads and the passages stay open and they get to where they want to go, whether it’s through Pakistan, Iran, up through Russia and all the known trade routes. So this is a very violent cartel,” Jones said. “They are buying their protection by funding other organizations, from criminal gangs to tribes, to inciting any kind of resistance to keep the government off of their back.”
Any disruption of the drug trade has enormous implications for Afghanistan’s economic and political stability. Although its relative strength in the overall economy has diminished as other sectors have expanded in recent years, narcotics is a $2.6 billion-a-year industry that this year provided more than a third of the country’s gross domestic product. Farmers who cultivate opium poppies receive only a small percentage of the profits, but U.S. officials estimate the crop provides up to 12 times as much income per acre as conventional farming, and there is violent local resistance to eradication.
“It’s almost the devil’s own problem,” CIA Director Michael V. Hayden told Congress last month. “Right now the issue is stability. . . . Going in there in itself and attacking the drug trade actually feeds the instability that you want to overcome.”
“Attacking the problem directly in terms of the drug trade . . . would undermine the attempt to gain popular support in the region,” agreed Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. “There’s a real conflict, I think.”
The Afghan government has prohibited the aerial herbicide spraying used by U.S. anti-narcotic programs in Latin America. Instead, opium poppy plants in Afghanistan are destroyed by tractors dragging heavy bars. But only 38,500 of nearly 430,000 acres under cultivation were eradicated this year.
Because of security concerns and local sensibilities, all eradication is done by Afghan police, and corruption is a major problem at every level from cultivation to international trafficking. Although the drug trade is believed to provide some financing to the Taliban, most experts believe it is largely an organized criminal enterprise. According to a major report on the Afghan drug industry jointly released last week by the World Bank and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, key narcotics traffickers “work closely with sponsors in top government and political positions.”
The report drew specific attention to the Afghan Interior Ministry, saying its officials were increasingly involved in providing protection for and facilitating consolidation of the drug industry in the hands of leading traffickers. “At the lower levels,” the report said, “payments to police to avoid eradication or arrest reportedly are very widespread. At higher levels, provincial and district police chief appointments appear to be a tool for key traffickers and sponsors to exercise control and favor their proteges at middle levels in the drug industry.”
Opium cultivation was outlawed during Taliban rule in the late 1990s and was nearly eliminated by 2001. After the overthrow of the Taliban government by U.S. forces in the fall of that year, the Bush administration said that keeping a lid on production was among its highest priorities. But corruption and alliances formed by Washington and the Afghan government with anti-Taliban tribal chieftains, some of whom are believed to be deeply involved in the trade, undercut the effort.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently noted that “once we thought terrorism was Afghanistan’s biggest enemy” but said that now “poppy, its cultivation and drugs are Afghanistan’s major enemy.”
Eradication and alternative development programs have made little discernible headway. Cultivation — measured annually with high-resolution satellite imagery that is then parsed by analysts using specialized computer software — is nearly double its highest pre-Karzai level.
“There is supposed to be a tremendous energy associated with this,” Jones said of the counter-narcotics programs, “but it needs a fresh look because . . . we’re losing ground.